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Domain Names, Globalization,
and Internet Governance
MARSHALL LEAFFER*
I. DOMAIN NAMES GENERALLY
A. Domain Names and Electronic Commerce
A form of property peculiar to the digital age, the domain name presents
questions of particular appropriateness to this Symposium. At first blush, how
we allocate rights over the exclusive right to use McDonalds.com may seem, to
the uninitiated, trivial compared to other more ostensible digital age issues.'
This attitude, of course, underestimates the stakes involved in fashioning a
reliable and stable domain name system. Indeed, it is hardly an understatement
to say that the ultimate administration and management of the system will
determine in large part the nature and health of digital commerce and global
communications.
The burgeoning conflicts over domain names reveal how the Internet has
raised thorny-perhaps intractable-problems for the law of intellectual
property. It has not only played havoc with the law of copyright, but also has
engendered a number of confounding issues in the law of trademark. Some of
the issues can be simply characterized as ordinary incidents of trademark
infringement moved to cyberspace; others, like the domain name issue, result
from digital age particularity.2 One thing is clear-electronic commerce, and
for that matter, all communications over the Internet, occupy an increasingly
larger part of the world economy. With its ever expanding importance for
* A Distinguished Scholar in Intellectual Property Law and University Fellow, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington; LL.M., 1977, New York University; J.D., 1971, University of Texas, School
of Law; B.A., 1964, University of Texas.
1. Issues include privacy and data protection concerns, electronic signature on contracts, and year 2000
compatibility, to name a few. These issues are explored in Symposium, LegalIssues in Cyberspace: Hazards
on the Information Superhighway, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996).
2. For an overview, see Sally M. Abel, TrademarkIssues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier (last
modified May 15, 1998) <http://www.fenwick.com/pub/cyber>.
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electronic commerce, unimpeded by national boundaries, the Internet will
inevitably engender unlimited opportunities for trademark infringement on a
global scale.3
One trademark-like issue tied to the global economy, and uniquely an
Internet problem, concerns the regulation of domain names. Again, consistent
with the theme of this Symposium, the domain name controversy concerns the
interplay of globalization, intellectual property, and sovereignty.
B. Domain Names and Internet Governance
Inherently an issue of global dimension, the institutional structure of domain
name regulation may well determine the future of Internet governance. Two
critical and overlapping questions concerning domain names are involved. The
first concerns the technical functioning of the system in expediting information
accurately to an infinite number of locations. As a corollary, an effective
system would provide certainty, stability, and efficiency in its management and
administration. Second, the system must be one that establishes clear
ownership rights to a domain name and minimizes conflict in ownership
disputes. In sum, an effective domain name system will function properly from
both a technological and management standpoint. It will also be one that
creates an effective mechanism for dispute resolution when a domain name
conflicts with the rights of trademark owners. Only then will such a system
operate properly, maximizing dissemination of information on a global scale.
The two questions presented above---one inherently technical, the other
primarily cultural-concern Internet standard setting. First, from a
technological standpoint, the current domain system reveals much about the
chaotic and jerry-built nature of cyberspace and its fragmented mode of
governance. The domain name system, like the Internet itself, exists in a
precarious state whose viability depends on the smooth workings of a few
3. For articles examining the trademark issue, see Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A
First Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 RicH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (April 10, 1995)
<http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/burk.html>; Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 695 (1998); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace:
Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996); G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right
on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277 (1997).
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computers.' The second question concerns how the domain system should be
structured to reconcile a myriad of intellectual property laws in a world of
nation-states and their enforcement within defined borders. This issue presents
another classic Internet problem--one that may prove more difficult to resolve
than that of technological standardization. It is a problem infused with national
legal cultures involving a multiplicity of trademark laws around the world. This
dimension of the domain name issue graphically illustrates the tension between
territorially-based intellectual property law, on the one hand, and the new
information technologies on the other. In short, the Internet is global;
trademark law is local.
In this Article, I will review the development of the domain name
controversy and the inadequacy of the current regulatory mechanism, which is
a hodgepodge of governmental regulation superimposed on traditional
territorially-based trademark law. I will examine some ofthe proliferating case
law and the disruption that this law has caused in the efficient operation of a
domain name system. I will then turn to proposals for change, the latest of
which is the Clinton Green Paper' and the subsequent Policy Statement.6 My
goal here is to reflect on the process of decisionmaking in the Internet
environment and how this relates to the management domain name system rather
than to specify the ultimate detailed structure that will eventually evolve.
Of the several models ofInternet governance, I will advocate a multilateral
4. The precarious state ofthe Internet has received much media coverage and has caused governmental
concern. See Frederic M. Biddle et al., One Satellite Fails, and the World Goes Awry, WALL ST. J., May 21,
1998, at B 1. This article refers to a computer the size of a pizza box, 1 of 13 that serve as address books for
Internet traffic to ensure that information goes where it is supposed to be sent. In the summer of 1997, the
company that controls Root Server A accidentally wiped out the critical address book. This glitch had spread
across the network, eventually affecting 35% of computers worldwide.
5. Improvement ofTechnical Management oflntemet Names and Addresses: Proposed Rules, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter "Green Paper"]. The Green Paper was the first step in
implementing the Clinton administration see Frameworkfor GlobalElectronic Commerce (last modified Aug.
5, 1998) <http://www.ecommerce.gov>. In this Proposal the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to
privatize the Domain Name System (DNS) in a way that would increase competition and encourage
international participation. The proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register on February 20, 1998,
solicited public comment until March 23, 1998. To view notices and comments, see Management ofInternet
Names and Addresses (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov>. The Green Paper proposed
privatization of the management structure of Internet names and addresses and the creation of a not for profit
corporation managed by a globally and functionally representative Board of Directors. The National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce,
called for public comments on publication of the Green Paper in the Federal Register. On March 23, 1998, the
comment period was closed. The Green Paper and commentary was followed by the "Statement of Policy."
6. Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10,
1998) [hereinafter "Statement of Policy"].
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solution to the domain name controversy based on a realist-institutionalist
concept of sovereignty7 which is largely consistent with current administrative
proposals. I call this a realist approach because I believe that self-interest
determines the behavior of States, that insecurity and rivalry reign, and that
power is the final arbitrator in that rivalry! My approach is
institutionalist-and pragmatic-because government has a positive, necessary,
and inevitable role to play in the regulation of domain names. Moreover,
governments are already involved in their regulation9 and will remain so. The
U.S. government, for instance, has set up the operation of domain names,
implemented the technical aspects of the system, and has authorized a
registration process for them. However, the U.S. government is not alone in the
regulation of domain names. Governments around the world are involved in
their operation and registration.
In addition to its technical operation, government regulates the domain
name system via trademark law. As applied to domain names, trademark law
is a body of law that continues to proliferate worldwide. Thus, the government
is present at all levels of the system and is here to stay.
The nature and extent of that governmental control, however, is a subject
of current debate because many difficult details must still be resolved before
establishing the most efficient form of domain name regulation. Clearly,
resolution of the problem necessitates a multilateral solution whereby essential
institutions materialize to create a technologically efficient system which also
minimizes legal conflicts. I argue thatthe least government involvement is best.
Whatever control is ultimately imposed should foster institutions in which
market forces can operate, flourish, and eventually supercede governmental
intervention.
7. lam using the term "sovereignty" as defined in RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNrTED STATES § 402 (1987):
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (IXa) conduct that, wholly or
in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests
in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
The question of net governance and sovereignty has developed a rich literature. See, e.g., David G. Post, The
"Unsettled Paradox: " The Internet, the State, the Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
521 (1998).
8. For a discussion of realism in international relations theory and its comparison with liberal
international relations theory, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J INT'L L. 503 (1995).
9. See Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty? - The Internet and the International System, 10
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 665 (1997); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155 (1997).
[Vol. 6:139
DOMAIN NAMES, GLOBALIZATION
Within the cooperative framework of this multinational solution, the United
States will play the most prominent role because it has achieved the most
knowledge and experience in administering the system. However, the domain
name system (like the Internet itself) transcends national boundaries. Its healthy
development will depend on the degree to which it is unencumbered by interest
groups or nations. Furthermore, its processes must be fair, transparent, and
encourage competition. In this context, a multilateral representative body
proposed by the Policy Statement that will coordinate the shape of the system
is the best outcome for domain name management. This representative body,
though established by government, should function independently from
governmental control or interference in the daily operation of the domain name
system.
II. WHAT ARE DOMAIN NAMES?
A. The Mechanics ofDomain Names: Sending Information to the Right Place
A domain name is a significant part of an Internet address that determines
where data packets are to be sent." To humans, domain names appear as
words, but when a domain name is used on the Internet, it is translated into
numbers. Users of the Internet only have to remember domain names, a much
edsier task than committing to memory a meaningless string of numbers. Each
domain name corresponds to numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, used by
the Internet to transmit data. Every computer linked to the Internet must have
a numeric address in order to be identified and located by others. The numeric
Internet address functions like a street address or a telephone number. Most
importantly, each address must be unique so that other computers on the
network are able to locate and to route messages to the correct address.
As a matter of convenience, the numeric Internet address is assigned an
alphabetical counterpart referred to as a domain name. The fact that domain
names are expressed in alphabetical symbols confers on them their trademark
10. A domain name is not unlike a "telephone number" on the Internet: it is an alphanumeric electronic
address consisting of a mnemonic sequence of characters. One or more computers at any one location may
receive a domain name that other computers or users then use to direct messages to the computer or group of
computers at the named location. A domain name consists of a generic top-level domain (gTLD) (e.g., corn,
org, edu, gov, or net) assigned according to the entity requesting activation, and a second-level domain (SLD)
of up to 22 characters. For an analysis of the domain name problem from a Canadian viewpoint, see Andrea
F. Rush, Internet Domain Name Protection: A Canadian Perspective, I 1 INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (1996).
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significance. It is of course this trademark aspect that transforms the domain
name beyond its mechanical function of expediting information to the right
place. The existence of alphabetical domain names-so practical from a
mnemonic standpoint-greatly complicates the administration of the system.
As such, domain names have entered irrevocably into the world of trademarks.
Because oftheir trademark quality, they facilitate electronic commerce. At the
same time, their alphabetical existence engenders a set of legal issues intimately
connected with complicated trademark laws existing within the territorial
confines of nation-states.
The address embodied in a domain name consists of three parts: (1) the
name of the user; (2) the name of the company or institution; and (3) an
organization or country designation. The address begins with a designator, and
everything following the symbol is called the domain name." A domain name
consists of a generic top-level domain (gTLD) (e.g., com, org, edu, gov, or net)
assigned according to the type of entity requesting activation and a secondary-
level domain (SLD) consisting of twenty-two characters. The institution
historically responsible for allocating top-level domain names is the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). 2 IANA coordinates its activity through
regional IP registries: American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) in
North America, R6seaux IP Europ6ens (RIPE) in Europe, and Asia Pacific
Network Information Center (APNIC) in Asia and the Pacific. In addition to
the gTLDs, country code top-level domain names, e.g., fr (France) or au
(Australia), identify foreign locations for a particular Internet address. 3
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) controls the distribution of gTLDs under a
contract with the National Science Foundation. NSI and a number of other
organizations operate the root servers that contain the master listings of IP
numbers. 4
11. For a description of the system, see Andy Johnson-Laird, The Internet: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly (visited Oct. 17, 1998) <http://www.jli.com>.
12. For information on the operation of lANA, see Internet AssignedNumbers Authority: About JANA
(last modified Sept. 24, 1998) <http://iana.org/aboutiana.html>.
13. For a comprehensive glossary ofDomain name terminology and organizations, see Network Solutions,
Glossary of Registration-Related Terms and Organizations (last modified Oct. 11, 1998)
<http://rs.intemic.net/glossary>.
14. The root server system is a set of 13 file servers, which together contain authoritative databases listing
all Top Level Domain Names (TLDs). At this time, NSI operates the "A" root server, that maintains the
authoritative root database and replicates changes to other root servers daily. Other organizations operate the
twelve remaining root servers. The U.S. government is involved in operatingabout halfof them. For a diagram
of the root server system, see Internet Domain Name System Root Servers (last modified Nov. 3, 1997)
<http://www.wia.org/pub/rootserv.html>.
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B. Domain Names as Legal Hybrids: Technology and Trademark Law
Because they do not fit conveniently into the bifurcated world of copyright
and industrial property (i.e., patent and trademark law), domain names are a
hybrid form of intellectual property." On the one hand, they serve a useful
purpose by designating where information is to be sent. On the other hand, they
often indicate origin, and the public views them as trademarks. The two
functions are fused in the same entity-the domain name. The problem is that
domain names must be unique in order to function properly. If more than one
organization on the Internet had the same domain name, confusion would occur
when the network tried to identify and communicate with the computers within
those organizations. This sets up an inherent and irreconcilable conflict with
trademark law, which tolerates the use of identical marks by different persons
so long as those uses do not cause confusion in the marketplace.
Thus, under trademark principles, the mark "Nationwide" could be used
simultaneously by someone in the trucking industry and by another who is in the
insurance business. By contrast, only one Nationwide.com can exist as a
domain name. If there were two entities using the same name, the domain name
system would not know which one of the IP addresses was associated with that
domain name. Many of the proposals to reform the domain name system had
attempted to reconcile the domain name system with that of trademark law. As
we will see, no panacea currently exists to solve the conflict, nor will one ever
develop. 6
To say that the system of domain name protection and registration is in
flux, even disarray, is an understatement. 7 Since 1993, NSI, under contract
from the National Science Foundation, has administered the registration of
domain names in the United States.'" NSI registers domain names on a first
come, first serve basis and is not required to investigate potential intellectual
property violations of third parties who might even have a federally registered
15. See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a
Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995)
(elaborating on the legal hybrid concept).
16. For a discussion of proposals to make the domain system more like trademarks see infra Part II1.
17. The problem of Internet domain names has spurred activity internationally. WIPO created a group
of expert consultants that rendered a report on Dec. 17, 1996. See World Intellectual Property Org., Meetings
of Consultants on Trademarks and Internet Names (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
<http://www.wipo.orgleng/internet/domains/tdnmcil.htm>.
18. NSI may be considered a quasi-governmental agency in that it receives funds from NSF, but it is a
private company.
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trademark identical to the domain name given to another. 9 This has caused
much controversy, and NSI policies on the persistent problems relating to the
preemption of domain names have been revised several times. NSI has
developed a dispute resolution mechanism to handle conflicts in domain names.
The current guidelines permit a trademark owner to challenge another's
registration and use of a domain name by presenting evidence of a federally
registered U.S. trademark. Despite these dispute mechanisms, trademark
litigation over domain names has continued to proliferate. Cases concerning
domain names have been brought on two theories: likelihood ofconfusion under
trademark law and action under state and federal antidilution law. 0 The former
has proven to be a less than satisfactory alternative for trademark owners. By
comparison, trademark owners, particularly against the activities of
cybersquatters, have asserted antidilution actions with great success.
HI. DOMAIN NAMES AND TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Appearance of the Cybersquatter and Others
Short simple indicators of origin, domain names always functioned as
trademarks, educating and reassuring the consuming public that they are
purchasing the right product for their particular needs. Despite the obvious
trademark significance of domain names, Internet engineering groups have
traditionally dismissed the trademark issue as a problem created by lawyers.
They have maintained that domain names were never intended to bear this
trademark dimension; they assume an attitude that ignores real world interests.2
Of course the truth is otherwise. A domain name, whether McDonalds.com or
GE.com, has an important origin-indicating significance in the vastly developing
world of electronic commerce.
For whatever reason, the current mechanism that allocates domain rights
largely avoids the consideration oftrademark interests. Most significantly, the
registration system for domain names operates on a first come, first serve basis.
Thus, it is possible for a third party to register a well-known domain, thereby
19. The cost of registering a domain name is $100 for the first 2 years, with annual renewal fees of $50
per year thereafter. See Network Solutions, Domain Name Registration Overview (last modified Aug. 25,
1998) <http:l/rs.internic.netldomain-info/domflow2.html>.
20. See infra notes 23-24, 28-29, 31-40, 42 and accompanying text.
21. See Alexander Gigante, Blackhole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 413, 426 (1997).
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preventing the trademark owner who has established goodwill in that name from
registering it. Companies then discover that their trademarks or service marks
cannot be used as domain name 2 addresses because someone else has already
taken the name. Outraged at this development, trademark owners have sought
relief under trademark law to remedy the problem.
Reasons vary as to why people will register a particular domain name. For
the most part, an individual selects a domain name for entirely neutral or
innocent reasons (i.e., an individual named "McDonald" may have always done
business under his name). The process of domain allocation, however, has
proven to be fertile ground for the opportunist who has reserved a domain name
in bad faith. Such registrants, known as Internet squatters or cybersquatters
have registered the name of a well-known company as an Internet address and
then attempted to sell or lease the name back to the rightful owner. The process
of allocating domain names inherently breeds conflicts of a trademark nature,
irrespective of the reason why a certain party selected a domain name. Thus,
any successful domain name regulation must serve two basic functions. First,
it must provide a stable registration system that allocates unique domain names,
avoiding conflict from a technical standpoint. Second, it must also have the
ability to resolve disputes between conflicting claims to a domain name under
trademark principles. The problem is that the current system was designed to
accommodate only the first function.
B. Domain Names and Trademark Law
As domain names become ever more important to global commerce, it is
hardly surprising that the use oftrademark law has increased to resolve disputes
over domain names. Unfortunately for trademark owners, traditional trademark
law provided little relief in claims against third parties who appropriated their
trademark as a domain name. Trademark law is based on the likelihood of
confusion. Much to the chagrin of trademark owners, it is difficult to prove that
the third party use of a trademark as a domain name causes consumer
confusion. This hurdle relates to the inherently utilitarian nature of domain
names. Because domain names are much like telephone addresses, trademark
22. For a discussion of the case law involving domain names see infra notes 23-24,28-29, 31-40,42 and
accompanying text.
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owners have found the confusion hurdle difficult to surmount.23 Frustrated by
the limitations of traditional trademark law, trademark owners turned to state
and federal antidilution law for relief. The antidilution conceptwas particularly
attractive in the domain name context because the trademark owner did not have
to prove a likelihood of confusion. Rather, the plaintiff had only to show that
the third party intended to dilute the distinctive quality of the mark. The main
drawback in bringing a dilution action was that the plaintiff must own a right
in a famous mark. As we will see, the courts have strictly complied with this
fame requirement.
C. Dilution Law
At the outset, state antidilution statutes have proven to be the most
successful remedy against third party use of their mark as a domain name.
Although state antidilution statutes provide a modicum of relief to aggrieved
trademark owners, they offer uncertain and uneven protection.24 The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA)25 (also known as section 43(c) of the
Lanham Act) provided missing uniformity and certainty, offering a potent new
remedy to trademark owners. Trademark owners gravitated quickly toward this
new federal law which, like the state antidilution laws, ignored customer
confusion and required only that the mark be famous according to criteria set
forth under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.26 Courts have accommodated
aggrieved trademark owners by reading the famous mark requirement
expansively, allowing owners of marks that are hardly household names to
obtain relief under the Act.
For these reasons, trademark owners of famous marks have looked to the
FTDA as the remedy of choice in domain name disputes. Indeed, the legislative
history of the Act seems to indicate that Congress intended the Act to provide
relief against piracy of domain names on the InternetY.2 The dilution concept,
despite its dubious theoretical basis, has quickly become entrenched in
American law. One may conclude that the FTDA will continue to be the most
successful basis for trademark owners in challenging domain name registrants.
23. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
24. See ActMedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No. 96-C3448, 1996 WL466527, at * 1 (N.D. I11. July
17, 1996) (reservation of"Actmedia.com" violated Illinois Dilution Statute).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995-1997).
26. Id.
27. See 141 CONG. REc. S 19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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One finds dilution applied readily from the outset when the defendant's use
tarnishes the plaintiffs mark and particularly when the defendant is a
cybersquatter. For example, in one early case, Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Ltd., the court granted a preliminary injunction against
the defendants for diluting the value of Hasbro's CANDY LAND mark for a
children's board game.28 The defendants were using the mark CANDYLAND
to identify their pornographic website and the domain name candyland.com to
access it.29
More and more cases are being filed under the FTDA, and the effect of the
Act is already being felt, particularly by cybersquatters ° For example, in
another federal dilution case, Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, the court granted
summaryjudgment against the use of the domain name Intermatic.com.3' The
court found INTERMATIC to be a strong, federally registered mark used for
over fifty years and therefore famous within the scope of the Dilution Act. 2
Moreover, the defendant registered the Intermatic as its domain name for the
purpose of selling it to plaintiff.3 Finally, defendant's registration diluted
plaintiff's mark because of its existence on the Internet site, and it adversely
affected plaintiff s mark by destroying its advertising value.34 The court not
only enjoined defendant's use of the mark but ordered that the domain name be
transferred to the plaintiff." A second case involving a California man named
Toeppen essentially reached the same result. 6 One particularly striking aspect
of the Intermatic cases was the court's readiness to find that the mark was
famous.
Although the antidilution law has proven to be a successful remedy against
the cybersquatter, its use has encouraged a wide variety of suits, catching in its
net the innocent domain users as well. The fact is that dilution law under
28. 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1480.
29. Id.
30. For a review of the cases, see Abel, supra note 2.
31. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (ND. I11. 1996), modified, No. 96-C 1982, 1998 WL 102702 at * I (N.D. 11. Feb.
28, 1998).
32. Id. at 1239.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1240.
35. Id. at 1241.
36. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (violation under the
Federal Act; transfer of trademark ordered), affd 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); American Standard, Inc. v.
Toeppen, No. 96-2147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *I (C.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1996) (transfer of diluting
domain name ordered under Federal act); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(dilution by tarnishment found); ActMedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No. 96-C3448, 1996 WL 466527,
at * 1 (N.D. III. July 17, 1996) (state dilution action against domain name sustained).
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section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is ill-tailored for the proper operation of a
domain name system. A recent case illustrates the tension between the dilution
concept and the domain name system." Prince Sports Group, a large sporting
goods company and owner of a federal registration for Prince challenged Prince
P.L.C., a small U.K. computer information services firm, for rights to the
domain name Prince.com?8 The U.K. company had obtained the domain name
two years earlier. 9 Prince Sports ultimately withdrew its lawsuit before a
decision, but not before forcing Prince P.L.C. to defend the suit to protect a
domain name based on its company name and mark of many years.0 The
Prince case reveals the potential chaos that exists under the national bodies of
trademark law. An effective system of domain must somehow reduce this
omnipresent conflict to provide users certainty, stability, and reliability.
Overall, resort to trademark litigation has hardly been a panacea for
trademark owners in the domain name context. As stated above, one must
prove likelihood of confusion in an action for trademark infringement. This is
not always an easy proposition in domain name cases. Even though it has
provided some spectacular victories for aggrieved trademark owners, dilution
law has three main limitations. First, the overwhelming number of marks that
do not enjoy famous mark status are excluded from its provisions.4 Second,
those trademark owners who do have famous mark status must prove it.
Finally, the FTDA will not come to the aid of a famous mark if plaintiffs mark
became famous only after defendant's use.4"
This brief overview of legal remedies leads one to the conclusion that
trademark and dilution law is ill-suited to the world of domain names. In a
perfect world, some other mechanism should be developed to resolve disputes
between the trademark and domain name worlds. Ideally, traditional trademark
law and dilution law should have a limited but important role to play in settling
domain name disputes. Indiscriminate use, however, of trademark and
37. For a discussion of this unreported case (Prince P.L.C. v. Prince Sports Group, Inc.), see Dawn
Osborne, Domain Names, Registration & Dispute Resolution andRecent UK. Cases, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REv. 644, 646 (1997).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995-1997) (listing the 8 criteria to be used in determining whether a mark
is famous and thus qualifies for protection under the Act).
42. See, e.g., Gateway 2000, Inc. v. Gateway.com, Inc., No. 5:96-CV-1021-BR(3), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2144, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 6, 1997) (preliminary injunction denied because it was not clear that
plaintiff's fame predated defendant's use; moreover, defendant's use was made in good faith).
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particularly dilution law could seriously undermine a smoothly working domain
system. An institutional mechanism is needed to channel disputes outside the
confines of trademark litigation in national courts.
What has caused the current problematic system is the focus on the
cybersquatter example to justify the use of dilution law. The cybersquatter
problem instead could be resolved either under traditional tort principles or
some form of sui generis law that would prohibit such activity. One could
easily determine whether the name relates to the registrant's legitimate business
or was obtained merely for the purpose of selling it to the trademark owner.
Like it or not, traditional trademark law and dilution law will continue to
influence domain name litigation. Accordingly, these bodies of law will have
a role to play despite any future revision of the domain name system.
Moreover, trademark litigation is not just a U.S. phenomenon, but has
counterparts in more and more jurisdictions worldwide.43 Ideally, what should
be created is a multilateral suigeneris legal regime enforced by centralized legal
rules, thereby avoiding the application of territorially-based trademark law. It
is unlikely that this will materialize in the near future because nations will not
dispense with their territorially-based systems and trademark owners will not
forego the use of trademark and dilution law that have been on occasion so
successful. As a result it will be necessary to look to a second-best
solution-one that provides a dispute resolution mechanism to avoid as much
domain name trademark litigation as possible. Unfortunately, the current
system whereby the U.S. government has conferred the task of domain name
registration on a quasi-governmental institution, NSI, falls far short ofthis goal.
IV. ACCOMMODATING THE RIGHTS OF TRADEMARK OWNERS WILL RIGHT
THE NEEDS OF TECHNOLOGY
A. NSI Regulation
Plaintiffs have been relatively successful in suits challenging unauthorized
use of their trademark in cyberspace, but the problem of domain name rights
will continue until a better method to avoid conflicts materializes.
43. See Torsten Bettinger, Trademark Law in Cyberspace-The Battle for Domain Names, 28 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. COPYRIGHT& IrrDUS. L. 508 (1997) (discussing German litigation); Tilman Mueller-Stofen,
Domain Name-Related Infringement Procedures in Germany, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 590 (1997); Ian A.
Buchan, Internet Issues in the United Kingdom, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 660 (1997).
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Unfortunately, the current system lacks a dispute resolution mechanism. As a
result, parties must resort to wasteful traditional litigation that encumbers the
domain name system. Understandably, the NSI does not account for trademark
litigation's confusion analysis requirement when granting registration for
domain names. It simply registers a name on a first come, first serve basis, with
a limit of one domain name per organization; this lack of analysis is a
manifestation ofNSI's desire to stay out of trademark disputes." Some would
like the NSI to require that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office resolve the
issue from the outset by requiring the applicant to obtain a U.S. trademark
registration. The obvious drawback is that the time its takes to obtain a
trademark registration (sometimes years, involving Office Actions and inter
partes proceedings such as Oppositions) would undermine the rapid
technological growth of the Internet. This time lag would force Internet domain
applicants to seek registration abroad in countries with faster procedures for
obtaining trademark registrations.
B. NSI Dispute Resolution Policies
To respond to the concerns of trademark owners, in July 1995, NSI
instituted a policy intended to address some of these issues. It established a
procedure to follow for parties claiming rights to the same domain name. Since
July 1995, NSI has issued three revisions to that policy; the most recent became
effective February 25, 1998."' Its four most important provisions can be
summarized as follows: (1) an applicant must submit a statement that to his
knowledge, the domain name requested does not interfere with or infringe on the
rights of third parties; (2) an applicant must have a bona fide intention to use
the Internet domain name on a regular basis; (3) an applicant must not seek the
domain for any unlawful purpose; (4) the owner of a U.S. federal or foreign
trademark registration may challenge NSI's assignment of an identical SLD if
the domain name holder began use after the challenger's trademark registration
44. The policy is set forth at Network Solutions, Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (last
modified Feb. 25, 1998) <http://rs.intemic.net/domain-info/nic-rev03.html>.
45. Id.
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or first use date.' The challenger sends NSI a certified copy of its registration
and a copy of its protest letter to the domain name holder."7 Once NSI's dispute
policy activates, NSI gives the domain holder thirty days to prove either that its
use of the domain predates both the first use of the challenging party's
registration and the effective date of that registration, or that the domain holder
has its own trademark registration." In the latter case, the domain holder will
be able to keep the domain, subject to an obligation to indemnify NSI4 9 If,
however, the domain name holder cannot demonstrate either case, then the
domain holder must give up the domain with a ninety-day phase out period. 0
The disputed domain then goes into a hold status where it is not available to
anyone pending the outcome of the dispute between the parties.5" Barring a
court order or a decision from an arbitration panel, placing the domain name
registration on hold is the best result a challenger can expect.
As one might guess from the number of revisions, the NSI dispute
resolution policy has satisfied few. 2 Owners of famous marks ignore the policy
because they can avail themselves of the antidilution statutes, and companies
having no trademark registration have been left out of the NSI system. In
effect, the NSI policy provides another example of how classic trademark law
resolutions fail to regulate usefully the regulation of domain names. After all,
one mark can have many owners, whereas the current Internet technology limits
one domain name per user. For example, in New York, there are many
simultaneous yet nonconfusing uses of the word "Brothers," who may be in the
trucking, dry cleaning, or restaurant businesses. But there can be only one
Brothers.com as a domain name. The solution to the domain name conflicts will
have to come from elsewhere.
Dissatisfaction with the current domain name system has prompted a
number of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
examine the system. The International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) and the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Network Solutions has been sued many times, and courts have refused to impose a duty on the
registrar to take any affirmative steps to safeguard the interests of trademark owners. See, e.g., Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (declining to find Network
Solutions liable as a publisher of advertising lenders under Section 32(2Xb) of the Lanham Act; the court also
refused to hold that Network Solutions's receipt of registration fees satisfied the commercial use requirement
of the Lanham Act).
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Clinton administration's Green Paper and Policy Statement conducted inquiries
into the current administration and management of domain names. These are
not the only studies and proposals of interest. Many other organizations have
entered into the field, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO),13 the International Trademark Association (INTA),"4 the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO)" and the European Union (EU).56  I will
concentrate on IAHC, the Green Paper, and the Policy Statement because they
raise the fundamental questions concerning the future governance of the domain
name system. As we will see, both the technical configuration of the system and
the trademark dilemma involve a number of critical policy choices that suggest
a highly defined institutional structure.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
A. The International Ad Hoc Committee
On February 4, 1997, an international group, IAHC, 7 issued a
comprehensive plan for the regulation and governance of the domain name
system. Its six major aspects may be summarized as follows. First, it
recommends the introduction of seven new gTLDs to increase the available
name space."5 Second, to encourage competition and consumer choice, it would
create an unlimited number of new domain name registries located throughout
53. See World Intellectual Property Org., Internet Domain Names (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/newindex/domains/htm>.
54. See Int'l Trademark Ass'n, INTA "White Paper": Trademarks on the Internet (last modified Nov.
18, 1997) <http://www.inta.org/wptoc.htm>.
55. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Examination of Domain Names (last modified
Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/officesltac/domain/tumdomain.htm>.
56. The Internet Domain Name System and Trademarks: Working Paper of the Commission Services,
EU-DG XV/E-3.
57. The IAHC was a coalition of participants from the Internet community created to examine the global
domain name system. Its members were the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA), Internet Society
(ISOC), and Internet Architecture Board (LAB).
58. See Int'l Ad Hoc Comm., Final Report of the InternationalAd Hoc Committee: Recommendations
for Administration and Management of gLTDs (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.gLTD-orgldraft-iahc-
recommend-00.html>.
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the world that would share a database of domain names. 9 Third, the IAHC
would establish a procedure to publish all applications for domain registrations,
enabling trademark owners to monitor activity on the registration front.6
Fourth, the Report envisages an on-line alternative dispute resolution procedure
administered under rules of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center.6 '
Fifth, it would resolve the multi-jurisdictional disputes arising from domain
name registrations. 2 Sixth, it would create a governance based on global
community oversight and consensus.63 These principles have constituted the
basic focus of most efforts to reform the domain name system, and as we will
see, they form the basis for the Clinton Administration's subsequent Green
Paper and Policy Statement.
The IAHC makes major steps in resolving the trademark dilemma. In
recognition of the limitations of the NSI's dispute policy, the IAHC plan
acknowledges the essential role of the national courts in resolving trademark
disputes. Unlike the NSI registration policy, a registrant will be required to
provide detailed information about what server it will use as well as complete
information for further contact.' In addition, the applicant must submit to the
jurisdiction of appropriate courts in the country where the registered domain is
located and must appoint an agent for service of process.65 This procedure
ensures that the trademark owner will enjoy at least a guaranteed venue in
which to pursue litigation. Moreover, SLD applications will be published on
a publicly available website that will enable trademark owners to police their
marks adequately.' Another key provision of the IAHC plan relates to
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including on-line mediation and
arbitration, as well as an innovative administrative challenge approach. Under
the proposed procedures, a trademark owner can directly challenge an SLD
either before or after the domain name has been assigned to the applicant.61
Once an SLD is challenged, an administrative challenge panel (ACP) composed
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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of trademark experts would determine the rights of the parties.6" WIPO would
be responsible for facilitating the ACP system.
69
In addition to its provisions on registration and dispute resolution matters,
IAHC advocates seven new top-level domain names to be added to com, org,
and net.7" The council has argued that several new domains are necessary so
that organizations that did not happen to be quick enough or rich enough to
register the domain identity of their choice could have more options.7 A
publicly available website will publish all applications for domain names when
received by the registrar.72 Such publication will enable trademark owners to
monitor infringing third-party use of their marks and will include pertinent
information about the applicant. Under the IAHC proposal, all gTLDs will
ultimately be shared among all registries. New registries will be dispersed
throughout the regions of the world. In addition, the Proposal has an elaborate
method of dispute resolution. In using the system, each applicant will agree to
participate in on-line mediation and in expedited binding arbitration under
WlPO rules."
Unfortunately, extending the number of top-level domain names involves
a trade-off. On the positive side, the increased number of gTLDs will allow a
greater number of registrations for the secondary domain name. For example,
under the IAHC proposal, McDonalds.com and McDonalds.store can coexist
without conflict in the system. To some trademark owners, however, that
capacity for coexistence is hardly a blessing. The reason is clear: the more
gTLDs that are added, the more difficult the policing function becomes. This
additional policing burden could be offset if the on-line mediation and challenge
68. Id.
69. Id. As originally conceived, the ACP procedure was to be limited to internationally known marks.
In a later revision, WIPO issued a draft proposal that would extend the ACP procedures to anyone who could
demonstrate one valid trademark registration. The hearing would apply likelihood of confusion analysis and
take into account equitable considerations.
70. Id. The 7 new generic top-level domain names proposed are: firm, store, web, arts, rec, info, and nom.
These new gTLDs will be added to the current list including: gov, edu, org, and various country codes.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. On February 28, 1997, a "Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name
Space of the Internet Domain Name System" (MoU) was inaugurated. With this memorandum of
understanding, the signatories agreed to voluntarily establish a new system ofadministration and management
of domain names. The MoU provides for the creation of: a Depository of the gTLD-MoU, a Policy Advisory
Body, an Oversight Committee, a Council of Registrars, and an Administrative Domain Name Challenge
Panels, as well as the new top-level domain names mentioned above. See Establishment of a Memorandum
of Understanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Space (gTLD-
MoU) (visited Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.gTLD.mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html>.
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mechanism works smoothly. In effect, the attempt to make a domain name
system more compatible with trademark law causes certain insoluble problems.
Every expansion in the number of gTLDs exacerbates these problems.
To solve the problems, one might envisage a system whereby the domain
system is no longer limited by a small number of top-level domain names.
Thus, rather than arbitrarily dividing top-level domain names into com, org, or
edu, domains could be divided into logical categories of goods and services and
personal use. Such a system could be based on the International Classification
of Trademarks established by WIPO under the Nice Treaty.74 If adopted, each
domain would bear the number corresponding to industry classification. To
illustrate, McDonalds.05.com could be differentiated from McDonalds.30.com.
The solution is flawed due to the nature of the international classification
system. For example, international "Class 5" encompasses both pesticides and
pharmaceuticals. 5 Since products with significantly different characteristics
exist within many of the classes, it is not uncommon to see identical trademarks
registered in the same class. This must not occur in a domain system where
there can be only one McDonalds.05.com.
A similar alternative might be based on the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Codes76 to identify the specific nature of the domain name
owner's products or services. SIC Codes, established by the U.S. government,
consist of four-digit designations and classify businesses by their type of
activity. Thus, the use of SIC Codes would allow the same domain name to be
used by different companies engaged in noncompetitive activities. SIC Codes
suffer from the same problems as the Nice Classification system. First, the
codes were not designed to designate differing product categories for trademark
purposes. Second, a code number after a domain name would mean nothing to
users of the Internet-and they never would, given that there are thousands of
codes. Finally, it is unreasonable to expect that other countries would accept
the U.S. SIC Code system.
74. For the text of the Nice Classification Treaty, see MARSHALL LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 509 (2d ed. 1997).
75. For a complete listing of the classes contained in the Nice Agreement, see TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE: TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) 755-84 (Jerome Gilson & Jeffrey
M. Samuels eds., 2d ed. rev. 1.1 1997).
76. SIC codes, now replaced by NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) can be found
at U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC Correspondence Tables (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm>, which has been devised pursuant to the North American
Free Trade Agreement and is compatible with the International Standard Industrial Classification System (ISIC)
devised by the United Nations.
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B. The Green Paper and the Statement of Policy
Building on the work of the IAHC, the U.S. Department of Commerce
released its Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Domain
Names and Addresses." This document, known as the Green Paper, took a
major step toward an overhaul in the management of the domain name system
and opened a comment period to examine the general ideas it proposed. The
resulting Statement of Policy" benefitted from the substantial comments from
diverse sources, including elaborations in the Green Paper.79 The basic thrust
of the Administration's proposals is that a coordinated basis is the best way to
manage the domain name system and that a stable, reliable system guaranteeing
universal connectivity requires coordination of the root server system. 0 To
coordinate these essential functions, the administration proposes a new U.S.-
based nonprofit organization to direct the expansion of the Internet domain
scheme. The new organization, to be run by a representative made up of an
internationally diverse group of Internet users, would also oversee the core
computers that keep track of cyberspace locations.8' After a transition period
of a few years, when the new corporation is operationally stable, domain name
system management will transfer to the private sector."2
In addition to the new corporation, the administration proposals envisage
the development of competitive registries that would encourage innovation and
77. See Green Paper, supra note 5.
78. See Statement of Policy, supra note 6.
79. The Green Paper and Statement of Policy agree on the basic principles that should guide the system
identified as: (1) stability (the current operation should not be disrupted); (2) competition (market principles
should govern the system where possible to ensure innovation and consumer choice); (3) private, bottom-up
coordination ("private-sector action is preferable to government control"); and (4) representation ("[tiechnical
management of the Internet should reflect the diversity of its users and their needs"). See Green Paper, supra
note 5, at 8827.
80. See id.; see also Statement of Policy, supra note 6, at 31,744. The DNS functions to be performed
on a coordinated, centralized basis for smooth functioning of the system identified by the Green Paper are:
(1) To set policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks; (2) To oversee the
operation of the Internet root server system; (3) To oversee policy for determining the
circumstances under which new top level domains would be added to the root system;
and (4) To coordinate the development of other technical protocol parameters as needed
to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet.
81. See Statement of Policy, supra note 6, at 31,744-45.
82. See id. at 31,744. For a discussion of the structure of the corporation, see id. at 31,744-45.
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consumer choice for future domain name registrants. 3 A system of competitive
registries would replace the current system in which one entity handles the entire
registration process. Thus, the registry function would be outsourced to
commercial entities, and these new registries would operate both the old and
new gTLDs in a competitive environment. The new corporation would have the
task of establishing and implementing the appropriate criteria for gTLD
registries.8 4 As for the creation of new gTLDs, the Policy Statement
recommends at this time no expansion of gTLDs but instead encourages
procession at a deliberate and controlled pace in which the new corporation will
play the major role. 5
The trademark problem presents the greatest challenge to the regulation of
domain names, and it is this aspect of the Administration's proposals that is
uncomfortably vague. The Policy Statement recommends that the U.S.
Government seek international support and call on WIPO to initiate a process
of resolving domain name trademark disputes and to maintain a database
permitting trademark owners to obtain the information necessary to protect their
trademarks.86 What form the dispute resolution mechanism will take is an open
question. Ideally, an alternative dispute mechanism, whether through WIPO or
the new Domain Name Management Corporation would reduce the chaos of
nation-state jurisdiction. The Policy statement, however, would limit the
alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the question ofcybersquatting and
piracy, rather than resolving conflicts between parties "having legitimate
competing interests in a particular mark.""1 Whatever form it takes, a properly
fashioned dispute mechanism should avoid much of the current conflict and
should be an integral part of the system. It will not, however, be a panacea due
to the chaotic complexity of the jurisdictional problem and the inherent
83. See id. at 31,74546-.
84. See id. at 31,744.
85. Id. at 31,746. Here, the Policy Statement differs from the Green Paper which suggested the creation
of five new gTLDs immediately. Green Paper, supra note 5, at 8829.
86. Statement of Policy, supra note 6, at 31,746-47.
87. Id. at 31,747. The Policy Statement recommends "that domain name holders agree to submit
infringing domain names to thejurisdiction of [the] court where the 'A' root server is maintained, or where the
registrar is domiciled." Id. The policy maintains "that allowing trademark infringement suits to be brought
wherever registrars and registries are located" will enable trademark owners to defend their rights in a
convenient jurisdiction. Id.
1998]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
incompatibility between trademark law and the web addresses system.8
VI. DOMAIN NAMES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE
A. Four Models of Net Governance
What is sorely needed is a system that better allocates domain name rights
with clarity and certainty, harmonizes the technological needs of the Internet,
and resolves the tension between an efficient domain name registration system
and trademark owners' rights. How this system should materialize depends on
one's notion of net governance. The various models can be characterized in
four categories. 9 The first may be called the model of territorial sovereignty,
in which nation-states impose a legal order within the confines of physical
boundaries. The second is a centralized law administered by a supranational
agency, such as WIPO, that would administer uniform rules on a global scale.
I call the third approach the libertarian model, whose advocates propose that the
optimal system will materialize from decentralized decisionmaking. The fourth
model, and the one that I believe offers the best opportunity for domain name
regulation, I call the institutional harmonization model whereby a consensus will
be established by multilateral agreement to impose the necessary mix of
technological standardization and territorial sovereignty necessary to construct
a viable system. I will address each of these models in turn.
B. Territorial Sovereignty
The territorial sovereignty model, where each sovereign exertsjurisdiction
over citizens falling within its territory, is not compatible with the needs of an
effective domain name system. For the purpose of creating a usable and
efficient domain name system, this jurisdictional model is obsolete and
inappropriate. Indeed, indiscriminate application of State trademark and
dilution law poses a current threat to the smooth workings of the system. A
88. In fact, Jonathon E. Moskin has argued that the new system of registering, envisaged by the
administration's proposal, will engender international litigation raising difficult questions about international
jurisdiction and service of process, conflicts of law, and enforcement of foreign precedents. See Jonathon E.
Moskin, Board the Moving Bus: Trademark Owners Beware of Proposals to Improve Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 213, 225-26 (1998).
89. For these competing models of Internet governance, I have drawn heavily on the typology developed
in David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative
Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.cli.org/emdraft.html>.
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viable domain name system would fail under the rigid notions of territoriality
and the mechanisms developed to avoid chaos in the overzealous application of
territorially defined law. In short, domain names, which are cyberspace
addresses, do not effectively reside in a physical location, and the efficacy of the
domain system requires expansion beyond territorial boundaries and into
globally integrated laws.
C. Unified Law
In stark opposition to the territorial model, one might envision a domain
system regulated by centralized authority under a unified legal regime. For
example, WIPO, or some such international organization, could, by multilateral
agreement, regulate domain names. The advantages derived from uniformity
are obvious, given that domain names must be part of a system that is global in
scope. Nevertheless, such a model of domain name governance is inappropriate
for the pressing task of devising an integrated and globally relevant system
because it would take too long to negotiate. As I have mentioned above, an
effective domain system involves a technological component that includes
standard setting and a registration system that allocates the right to a domain
name. It will also involve a resolution of the trademark problem, an issue
infused with traditional and cultural notions of territoriality and sovereignty.
Though the international community might agree on technological standards
quite quickly, the arduous and extended process of negotiating international
trademark agreements would take much too long.
D. Net Libertarianism
Individual nation-states applying a territorially-based system as the primary
lawmaking authority have not always had, to say the least, an impeccable track
record. Likewise, a system of unified law will never come to fruition in any
reasonable time frame. But what is the alternative? In sharp contrast to both
nation-state territoriality or a unified legal system, Internet libertarians proffer
a third model for effective net governance. They argue for a radical
decentralization of lawmaking-that is, development of processes that do not
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impose order on the electronic world but through which order can emerge. °
This model of decentralized emergent decisionmaking, a modem Jeffersonian
vision of net governance, is based on the sovereignty of the individual. In this
vision, individual decisionmakers exercising individual choices will build
political order. Here, "independent . ..access providers, rather than
territorially-based states, become the essential units ofgovernance.... ,"' "The
'law of the Internet' thus emerges, not from the decision of some higher
authority, but [from] the aggregate... choices made by individual system
operators about what rules to impose... and about which online communities
to join."'
According to libertarian theory, this benign chaos will produce aviable and
efficient market for law which, like all such markets, will be a "powerful
information-processing device." This decentralized market-driven environment
will generate "remarkable degrees of coordination," much like biological
systems, "which evolve without any centralized decisionmaking at all."
Consider the Internet itself. No sovereign authority or treaty decreed that a
specific set of such standards must be used in order to link each of the diverse
individual networks together into a single global web. Cyberlibertarians believe
that fatal conflicts between inconsistent domain registration systems can be
avoided without top-down controls or the coercive power of the State. When
incompatible systems arise, only one ultimately will remain because the network
externalities will be too great. Thus, in the long-run, incompatible systems
would be unlikely to coexist because network economies will lead to the
efficient solution.
The libertarian vision of decentralized net governance has a certain appeal.
It is true that traditional legal institutions are not situated to regulate the kind
of disputes that arise between trademark owners and domain name owners. I
believe, however, that the libertarian model emerged from a flawed concept of
the Internet. When applied to domain name regulation, the libertarian model is
not rooted in practical reality, either from a technical or a political standpoint.
First, cyberliberatrians seem to assume that cyberspace is itself a sovereign
country-a utopian anarchy that will lead to a single, stable system for domain
90. Id.
91. David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 155, 166-67 (1996). One might call it
"a Hayekian utopia." See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, XXXV AM. ECON. REv. 519(1945).
92. Id. at 167.
93. Id. at 169.
94. Id. at 170.
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names. I suspect, however, that it would take a long and chaotic period of time
before network economics settle on one system. Second, other legal hurdles will
likely arise along the way, such as antitrust issues that would inevitably arise
when participants in the system agree on standards. Finally, the libertarian
model under plays the trademark problem. In particular, it is difficult to see
how a decentralized system would resolve the problem of cybersquatters and
others who would exploit the system in bad faith. These trademark issues are
too infused with the cultural norms embodied in the trademark laws of a
multiplicity of nations. In sum, I do not think that decisionmakers would
tolerate the risks and uncertainty that complete governmental withdrawal from
the system would likely cause. In addition, neither nation-states nor trademark
owners will abandon their territorially separate laws.
I reject the force of the libertarian position because I do not view
cyberspace as a sovereign place with its own jurisdiction, rules, governance,
and adjudicatory mechanisms.9" It is not a sovereign place mainly because
governments do not view it as such and have already imposed regulatory
authority over it. The reality is that government already regulates cyberspace,
and any remaining pockets of decentralized autonomy that still exist survive
solely by leave of governments. From a standpoint of expediency, I do not think
a deregulated market without governmental intervention is possible. Nation-
states already regulate the technical aspects of the domain name system, and
national versions of trademark law have been superimposed on the system.
In other words, however much cyberlibertarians rail against centralized
governmental authority on the Internet, the government retains nominal control
over the machine known as root server that distributes new address information
to the other root servers worldwide. The root server is the linchpin in the
system that allows web users to view, for instance, the White House home page
no matter where they are. However much the cyberlibertarians would like to
will away nationally defined trademark law, the multiplicity of territorially
defined State trademark law will continue to apply for some time to come. The
regime that will best serve the global community of domain users must take into
account the realities of national sovereignty and at the same time develop
institutions that will permit technological efficiency and reduce trademark law
95. For an elaboration on the cyberspace as a sovereign place, see Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government:
Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism? 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 417-19 (1997); 1. Trotter
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 993, 1053 (1994).
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disputes. This solution will reside in multilateral agreements on the
technological front, in the eventual competitive market for domain registries,
and in a viable dispute resolution mechanism.
VII. TOWARD A COORDINATED MULTILATERAL SOLUTION
BASED ON RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST
The three models of Internet governance embody certain truths about this
exploding medium, yet all manifest shortcomings as a viable model in the real
world. I agree with the territorial sovereignty model to the extent that I believe
that there will always be pockets of territorial sovereignty imposed on aspects
of the Internet. Under the unified law model, a viable and smoothly working
Internet must develop institutions that are internationally diverse. Like the
cyberlibertarians, I believe that the market forces, and minimal governmental
interference will lead to a flourishing, more efficient system that will meet
consumer demands. Nonetheless, these three models are incomplete in their
approach.
My thesis is that the domain name issue lends itself to a coordinated
multilateral solution based on national interest. Here, individual nations acting
in their rational self-interest should be able to fashion a comprehensive and
global system for domain name regulation. In the tissue of relationships that
constitute cyberspace, some questions lend themselves more easily to a top-
down multilateral cooperative solution among nation-states than others. The
management of the domain name system is one such Internet issue whereby an
institutional structure can be developed among nations. I do not mean to imply
that all Internet issues conveniently lend themselves to a coordinated, centralized
form of regulation. For example, cultural issues such as content on the Internet
(e.g., pornography) do not lend themselves well to such regulation. By contrast,
multilateral cooperation concerning the system of domain names is a plausible
solution. Though international cooperation and the erection of an institutional
structure for the regulation of domain names will be difficult, particularly for
the trademark infringement problem, the establishment of technical standards
such as Internet protocols is much more amenable to a top-down application
based on a multilateral agreement.
In this context, the general thrust of the Green Paper and the Policy
Statement is fundamentally sound, even though somewhat vague in important
details. The technological management of the domain system involves several
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important tasks in its operation.' The delicate nature ofthese tasks necessitates
that they be performed on a coordinated, centralized basis to ensure a smoothly
running Intemet. At the same time, the Administration's proposals are sensible
in recommending that government be progressively phased out of the system.
The government will gradually withdraw to be replaced by a nonprofit
corporation. If properly structured, this will foster a stable, reliable, and
efficient environment for the operation of the Internet and encourage effective
competition in the registration and maintenance of domain names. Moreover,
because the Internet is a global medium, the proposals recognize that the board
membership should be internationally diverse. Although the new corporation
will ultimately administer the system, governmental authority will continue
during the period of transition. Though the new private corporation will
determine important matters, such as the number of gTLDs and the nature of
the dispute resolution mechanism, governmental authority will determine the
institutional structure of the new corporation and the scope of its
decisionmaking ability. Ideally, the new corporation will have significant
autonomy. However, it will never exist independent from governmental
authority. Thus, the Green Paper and the Policy Statement have taken what I
have termed the realist-institutionalist approach to domain name regulation, an
approach that provides a plausible and pragmatic solution to a pressing concern
in the future of the Internet.
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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